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THEE Kian Wie** and Kunio YOSHlHARA***
I Industrial Development since the
Late 19608
The unsettled political conditions of the
1950s and first half of the 1960s were not
favorable to economic development 10
general and industrial development 10
particular. With the Indonesian economy
steadily deteriorating during the first half
of the sixties, the small manufacturing
sector was burdened with under-utilized
capacity, as the flow of imported raw
materials and parts and components slowly
dwindled to a trickle as a result of steadily
declining foreign exchange reserves.
With the advent of a new government
* In May 1986. we conducted a number of
interviews with Japanese businessmen in
Jakarta. Although we cannot name them
individually, we would like to record our
appreciation to those who gave us their
valuable time. We would like also to express
our appreciation to JETRO for letting us use
their Indonesian collection. Also at lETRO,
Mr. Sori Harahap often provided us with
information on Indonesian businesses, for
which we are very grateful. Lastly, we would
like to thank Dr. Dorodjatun Kuntjorojakti
of Universitas Indonesia for letting us use
liberally his files on Indonesian businesses
and industries. Without this help, this study
would have been impossible.
** Economic and Development Studies Center,
LIP!, Indonesia
*** s}jj{?\C::::R:, The Center for Southeast Asian
Studies, Kyoto University
in 1966 which, unlike the previous govern-
ment, was strongly committed to economic
development, industrial development started
in earnest for the first time since indepen-
dence. In the period 1966-1968 the average
annual growth rate of the manufacturing
sector reached 6. 02 percent, and accelerated
to 12.44 percent during the following three
years.
We can divide industrial growth since
the late 1960s into three phases: a) the
phase of 'easy' import substitution (1968-
1975), b) the phase of 'moving upstream'
(1975-1982), and c) the phase of slowdown
(1982-present) .
a) The first phase (1968-1975) : 'easy'
import substitution. During this period a
wide range of locally made consumer goods
(including light consumer goods and con-
sumer durables) gradually replaced imported
goods. The firms which produced these
consumer products were set up by domestic
(i. e., national) and foreign investors who
were spurred by highly protective import
substitution policies as well as by the
Foreign Investment Law of 1967 and the
Domestic Investment Law of 1968 [Thee
1983 : 2J. This pattern of investment is
quite similar to that of other Southeast
Asian countries. such as the Philippines,
Thailand, and Malaysia, which experienced
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a surge of foreign and domestic invest-
ment to set up 'tariff factories' (behind
highly protective tariff walls).
Most, if not all, of these factories merely
undertook 'final assembling' or 'end process'
activities. For example, completely knocked
down kits (CKD kits), containing a set of
inter-related parts and components, were
imported from abroad and assembled locally
into final consumer goods. The bulk of
these imported parts and components were
often supplied by the parent companies
located in the home countries.
b) The second phase (1975-1982) : mov-
ing upstream. After 1975 the domestic
market for most basic consumer goods
gradually became saturated, signaling the
completion of the relatively easy phase
of import substitution industrialization.
Spurred by the example of the newly
industrializing countries (NICs) and buoyed
by vastly increased oil revenues, particularly
after the second oil boom of 1978/79,
Indonesia's policy makers opted to push
the process of industrialization one stage
further by moving upstream into basic
industries, resource processing industries,
capital goods and intermediate goods indus-
tries, and a few strategic high technology
industries (notably the aircraft assembly
industry).
In pushing this 'backward integration,'
the Indonesian government, through man-
datory 'local content' programs (in Indo-
nesia referred to as 'deletion programs'),
required assembler firms, particularly in
the automotive industry (specifically com-
mercial vehicles), the diesel engine indus-
try, the electric generator industry, the
828
rice huller industry, and the household
electric appliance industry, to manufacture
locally a specified percentage of parts and
components which until then had been
imported. While in the case of certain
components, the assemblers were allowed
to make the components themselves (in-
house manufacture), other parts and com-
ponents had to be procured locally from
independent, unaffiliated firms, preferably
from small subcontractors (out-house manu-
facture) [Thee 1984: 35].
The 'deletion programs' stipulated that
the number or proportion of locally made
parts and components have to be reached
within a specified period of time. For
instance, in the motor vehicle industry, it
is stipulated that commercial vehicles (i.
e., buses and trucks) have to be 'fully
manufactured' by 1987/88 [Ministry of
Industry 1984]. This implies that these
locally assembled commercial vehicles will
eventually have to use all locally made
parts, including engines [Thee 1984: 15].
To a large extent the decision to move
upstream was influenced by the perceived
-need "to maintain the growth momentum
of the manufacturing sector as well as to
'deepen' Indonesia's industrial structure
through the generation of as many back-
ward and forward linkages as possible
with a view to strengthen the manufactur-
ing sector and to transform the pattern of
Indonesia's foreign trade so as to decrease
the share of manufactured imports as well
as increase the share of manufactured
exports" [CSIS 1982: xx]. These strong
views of the major decision-makers of
industrial policy were reflected in the
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extension of protection against imported
intermediate and capital goods.
Stimulated by rising domestic demand
for a wide range of intermediate and
capital goods as well as by the strongly
protectionist policies of the Indonesian
government, industrial development dur-
ing the latter half of the 1970s led to a
substantial change in the structure of the
manufacturing sector. While the tradi-
tional, relatively labor-intensive, light con-
sumer goods industries, such as food
products, beverages, and tobacco, began
to grow less rapidly during the latter half
of the 1970s more capital- and technology-
intensive industries producing a wide range
of intermediate and capital goods (includ-
ing consumer durables) came to the fore
[Roepstorff 1985 : 35J.
According to a UNIDO study conducted
by Roepstorff, the share of consumer goods
(excluding consumer durables) in total
manufacturing value added (MVA) dropped
steeply from 80.8 percent in 1971 to 47.6
percent in 1980. On the other hand, dur-
ing the same period the share of inter-
mediate goods rose from 13. 1 to 35. 5
percent, while the share of capital goods
(including consumer durables) rose from
6. 1 to 16. 9 percent. The study also reveals
that the share of the more traditional,
labor-intensive food products, beverages,
and tobacco dropped by almost one half
during the decade, from 63. 8 to 31. 7
percent. However, the shares of inter-
mediate industries, namely wood products
(excluding furniture), industrial chemicals,
other chemicals, rubber products, and
other nonmetallic minerals (particularly
cement) rose respectively from 1.4 to 7.0
percent, 0.8 to 4.3 percent, 3.8 to 7.1
percent, 1. 3 to 4.8 percent, and 2.5 to
5.9 percent. The iron and steel industry
emerged during this period, producing
3.1 percent of total MVA in 1980 (com-
pared to 0 percent in 1971) [ibid.: 36-
37].
The structural change which has taken
place in Indonesia's manufacturing sector
is also reflected in the striking changes
which have taken place in the composition
of imports. While the share of imported
consumer products amounted to 22. 1
percent (US $ 180. 7 million, cif) of total
imports (excluding the imports of oil and
gas) in 1969/70, this share had declined to
5. 6 percent (US $ 603. 5 million) by 1984/
85. On the other hand, during the same
period the share of imported intermediate
goods increased slightly from 48. 8 percent
(US $ 399. 7 million) to 53. 1 percent (US $
5, 749. 8 million), while the share of im-
ported capital goods rose from 29. 1 percent
(US $ 238. 7 million) to 41. 3 percent (US $
4,477.8 million) [Republic of Indonesia
1986 : 209-212].
c) The third phase (1982-present) :
slowdown since 1982. Since 1982 Indo-
nesia's economic growth in general and
industrial growth in particular have slowed
down considerably as a result of the
weakening of the world oil market. As
a result, considerable concern has arisen
about the gross inefficiency of the manu-
facturing sector and its general inability
to achieve international competitiveness,
which would be necessary if the manu-
facturing sector were to replace the oil
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sector as the engine of Indonesia's economic
growth and as the major source of foreign
exchange earnings.
The Fourth Five Year Development
Plan (Repleta IV) for the period 1984/85-
1988/89 had actually targetted manufactur-
ing growth at 9. 5 percent. However, in
view of the protracted sluggishness of
industrial growth, widespread concern has
emerged, particularly after a spate of lay-
0ffs by a number of manufacturing firms.
Critics of current industrial policy have
therefore suggested that the government
abandon, or at least postpone, the highly
capital- and technology-intensive industries
which were promoted during the two oil
booms of the 1970s, and shift to a more
outward-looking and less protectionist
policy that would encourage the more labor-
intensive, export-oriented industries in
which Indonesia has a comparative advan-
tage.
II The Agents of Industrialization
Who then undertook Indonesia's indus-
trialization? In asking this question, we
are really asking who organized necessary
inputs for industrial production in the
country. Here, we are not particularly
interested in individual people and in-
stitutions, however, but in certain cate-
gories.
The categories we are interested in are
'the state,' 'Indonesian entrepreneurs,' and
'foreign capita!.' And we call the compa-
nies owned by the first, state enterprises;
by the second, private Indonesian compa-
nies; and by the third, foreign companies.
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Below we will discuss primarily these three
categories of companies, and treat them
as the agents of industrialization, even
though the actual agents are the people
and organizations behind them.
In some ASEAN countries, there is no
interest in the first category, since the
state is not directly involved in industrial-
ization. But in Indonesia, since the Sukarno
period, the state has been an active par-
ticipant and dominates certain sectors.
So, in order not to attribute the rise of
Indonesian capital completely to private
Indonesian capital, we decided to separate
state from private capital.
As usual, foreign companies include 100
percent foreign-owned companies and joint
ventures--that is, the companies in which
there is foreign equity.I) In addition,
however, we include the private Indonesian
companies which depend heavily on foreign
licensing.
What constitutes 'heavy dependency' is
somewhat a matter of subjective judg-
ment. Many of the large companies we
regard as private Indonesian companies
use foreign technology. But they are not
regarded as foreign companies, because
their dependency on foreign technology is
not crucial.
The companies which depend 'crucially'
or 'heavily' on foreign technology produce
foreign-brand products. For example, all
automobile assemblers are owned by
Indonesian capital: by law, foreign equity
1) At present, there are few 100 percent foreign-
owned companies in Indonesian industry. The
only exceptions are garment manufacturers
in the bonded warehouse zone in Tanjung
Priok, Jakarta.
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is not allowed in this sector. These assem-
blers, under the technical assistance of
foreign (largely Japanese) auto makers,
make foreign-brand motor vehicles. We
also find similar examples in household
electrical appliances.
These companies are considered foreign,
because they depend almost totally on
foreign companies for operation. If their
licenses were withdrawn, they would hardly
survive.2 ) However, there are Indonesian
companies which make products under
both foreign and their own brands. In
this case, unless the 'own brand' products
are really minor, they are considered to
be private Indonesian companies. For ex-
ample, a tire manufacturer, a few cigarette
manufacturers, and a number of pharma-
ceutical companies fall in this category.3)
Therefore, foreign companies in this
paper include some in which there is no
foreign equity, but exclude others in which
foreign equity is involved. In the case of
a joint venture with minority foreign
equity, foreign control may be negligible.
Such a company has to be excluded. Thus,
a foreign company in this paper simply
means one that depends on foreign equity
and/or foreign technology 'heavily' or
2) One example is the once prominent Indokaya
group which virtually vanished after it lost
the Nissan license.
3) Besides producing their own brand products,
the tire manufacturer, Gadjah Tunggal, pro-
duce the 'Yokohama' brand of tires and the
'Inoue' brand of tire tubes; the cigarette
manufacturer, Sumatra Tobacco Trading, pro-
duce the 'Salem' and 'Winston' brands of
cigarettes ; and the kretek cigarette manufac-
turer, Bentoel, produces the 'Marlboro' brand
of cigarettes. (To be more exact, Bentoel's
subsidiary produces the 'Marlboro' brand.)
'substantively'.
III Industrial Structure
It is beyond the bounds of endeavor
for us to cover the entire manufacturing
industry. What we intend to do is to take
the industries in which foreign capital
tends to be important,4) and investigate the
relative importance of the state enterprises,
private Indonesian companies, and foreign
companies.
The typical method in this type of in-
vestigation is to use an industrial census
as the major data source.S) However, be-
cause of the problem of the reliability of
the census data, and because what has
been published is too aggregative for an
in-depth analysis, we decided to use a
different approach. For each of the in-
dustries in which we are interested, we
identified the major companies involved and
classified them according to the categories
just discussed. And from market share,
production or production capacity (depend-
ing on the availability of data), we tried
to compute their relative importance.
We focus on major companies, since
they are the vanguard of industrialization,
and there is a great deal of interest in
4) One of the authors studied Singapore and
the Philippines. See Yoshihara [1976; 1985].
From these studies, we had a rough idea
of what industries might have a high foreign
share.
5) In V. N. Balasubramanyam [1984J, the 1974
industrial census are used to compute the
relative importance of the three categories
of companies. Also, the same data is used
in Peter McCawley [1979: 29J, and Hal Hill
[1985: Tables 20 and 21].
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Table 1 The Relative Importance of the Foreign Companies.
State Enterprises. and Private Indonesian Companies
(Measured on the 10 Point Scale)
theinlisteddustries
table.
companies with large ship-
yards--the companies
which are usually regarded
as the modernizers of the
industry.
Table 1 is the result
of our findings. In an
industry in which it was
possible to quantify the
relative importance of the
three categories of com-
panies, this was shown by
distributing a total of 10
points over the three.
When it was difficult to
quantify, the relative im-
portance is indicated in
words. In the rest of this
section. we will briefly
discuss in turn the in-
1. Food and Beverages
Soft Drinks
In the area covered by
P. T. Djaya Beverages
Bottling Co., the major
bottler of Coca Cola, the













6) Interview with Mr. Yoshiaki Hatanaka of P.






percent of total soft drink
consumption in Indonesia,
foreign companies' market
share is only about 45 percent (in terms
of quantity) .6) There is an Indonesian
company called Teh Botol 80sm, which
























Note: * prescribed medicine only.
** 'states' enterprise. (See the text for explanation.)
Source: See the text.
knowing how domestic response has been
in this upper stratum. For example, in
the shipbuilding and repairing industry,
there are numerous companies catering for
the need of fishermen and small shippers,
but by excluding them, we can focus on the










4. Pulp & Paper
Pulp 3 4
Paper 1 2
5. Cement 2 4
6. Petroleum Refining 10
7. Petrochemicals In the middle-stream. state enterprises and
foreign companies are more important. but
in down-stream. private Indonesian com-
panies dominate.
8. Fertilizer
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brands combined. This company, which
began production only about 10 years ago,
has made spectacular progress by focussing
on non-carbonated drinks (foreign brands
are usually carbonated) and offering the
consumers a much lower price (at present,
about half the price of Coca Cola). In
this industry, there are no state enter-
prises.
Monosodium Glutamate (MSG)
In the other ASEAN countries, the
Japanese company Ajinomoto has a virtual
monopoly over this product, but in Indo-
nesia, its market share is about 37 percent,
which is a little smaller than that of the
Indonesian brand 'Sasa' [Technomic Con-
sultants 1984: IV-146] . There is another
foreign brand 'Miwon' (a Korean brand),
but its market share, about 13 percent,
is much smaller than Ajinomoto's. For a
food industry, the MSG industry is capital-
intensive, and is difficult for a Southeast
Asian company to succeed, but the company
producing 'Sasa' (Sasa Fermentation, a
member of the Roda Mas Group) has been
quite successful.
Cigarettes
There are two foreign companies (BAT
Indonesia and Faroka) producing prestig-
ious foreign brands, but they do not domi-
nate the cigarette industry.T) They produce
what the Indonesians call 'rokok putih'
(white cigarettes), and even in this field,
there are two large private Indonesian
companies (Sumatra Tobacco Trading and
Kisaran Tobacco, both at Medan) compet-
7) BAT's well known foreign brands are 'Benson,'
'Ardath,' 'State Express: and 'Lucky Strike,'
and Faroka's are 'Dunhill' and 'Pall Mall.'
ing with them. Furthermore, 'rokok putih'
are less popular than clove cigarettes
('rokok kretek'). The giants in the clove
cigarette industry are three private Indo-
nesian companies: Gudang Garam, Djarum
Kudus, and Bentoel. In 1981, these three
companies accounted for about two thirds
of the clove cigarettes sold [ICN May 2,
1983 : 8]. In this industry, there are no
state enterprises.
Beer
Three companies are producing beer in
Indonesia today (Multi Bintang Indonesia,
Delta Djakarta, and San Miguel Brewery
Indonesia). All of them are foreign com-
panies.8 ) There are no Indonesian com-
panies in this industry. This contrasts
with the situation in Thailand and the
Philippines, where local beer companies
are strong. In Indonesia, beer is one of




In this industry, Japanese companies
dominated for some time since production
began in 1972. However, their position
has recently been eroded by the entry of
an increasing number of private Indonesian
companies.
In nylon filaments, two Japanese com-
panies, Indonesia Toray Synthetics and
Indonesian Asahi Chemical Industry,
8) The foreign investors in these companies are
Heineken of Holland (Multi Bintang), NV.
De Brouwerij De Drie Hoefijzer of Holland
(Delta Djakarta), and San Miguel of the Phil-
ippines (San Miguel Brewery Indonesia).
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monopolize production. In the more impor-
tant polyester fibers, however, some private
Indonesian companies have made inroads
into the market. They first moved into the
polyester filament market (starting in 1979),
then into the polyester staple fiber market.
In polyester filaments, the Japanese com-
pany Tifico is the only foreign company
involved, and its capacity was only about
30 percent of the total in early 1986.9) In
polyester staple fibers, the only Indonesian
company operating then was Tri Rempoa
at Tangerang, but by the middle of 1987,
two more private Indonesian companies
are scheduled to commence production.
In early 1986, Tri Rempoa accounted for
about 25 percent of the total installed
capacity.10)
Spinning
In early 1986, 86 companies belonged to
the Indonesian Spinners Association, and
the total number of spindles was about
2. 4 million. Of these, state enterprises
accounted for 21 percent, private Indo-
nesian companies 48 percent, and foreign
companies 27 percent (Japanese 10, Hong
Kong 7, and Indian 10 percent).11) In this
sector, private Indonesian companies were
weak in the early 1970s, but by 1984 there
were 35 private Indonesian spinning mills,
some of them quite large. (The largest
was Agropantes, which owned about 90, 000
spindles. This was bigger than any foreign
9) To move into polyester filament was easier
since the optimum scale of production is
smaller.
10) The data for this paragraph were supplied
by Indonesia Toray Synthetics.
11) The data source is ASPI (Indonesian Spin-
ners Association).
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or state spinning mill.)
Weaving and Garments
In weaving, although there are no official
statistics, evidence indicates that private
Indonesian companies are dominant. For-
eign companies, except those engaged in
spinning at the same time, are not al-
lowed in this sector. Out of the 29 foreign
companies engaged in spinning, 15 were
also engaged in weaving.12) The other 14
companies sold all of their yarn to private
Indonesian weavers. The 15 companies
which were also engaged in weaving did
not consume all of their yarn. On average
40 percent of their yarn seems to have
been sold. lS) So, their share in fabric
production must have been much smaller
than in spinning. In the case of garments,
although there are a few foreign companies
in the bonded warehouse zone at Tanjung
Priok, and some of the Indonesian com-
panies obtain technical assistance from
foreign companies, this sector is almost
completely dominated by private Indonesian
companies.
3. Plywood
In the early 1970s, practically no plywood
was produced; but in the mid 1970s, prog-
ress began under the encouragement of
the government, which wanted some pro-
12) The data source is ASPI.
13) This percentage was computed by assuming
that one spindle produces roughly 20 pounds
of yarn per month and one loom consumes
700 pounds of yam per month. (The number
of spindles and the number of looms of for-
eign textile companies were available at ASPI.)
The yarn produced in excess of what could
be consumed by their own looms was consid.
ered to have been sold.
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cessing on logs being exported. Then
came the so-called SKB Tiga Menteri
(Surat Keputusan Bersama Tiga Menteri),
a joint ministerial decree issued by three
ministers, which banned log exports from
1980. After this decree, the increase of
plywood production accelerated, and in
1984, production reached a level of 3.9
million cubic meters. In mid 1985, 98 mills
were operating, of which 15 were foreign
companies and the rest were private
Indonesian companies. In terms of capacity,
the 15 foreign companies accounted for 16
percent of the total [ICN August 12, 1985:
15-26].
4. Pulp and Paper
Although the government is involved m
this industry, its relative importance m
paper production is not large. In 1984,
five state enterprises produced about 90, 000
tons, which was about 22 percent of the
total production. A foreign (Taiwanese)
company (Indah Kiat) accounted for an-
other 13 percent, and the rest was pro-
duced by private Indonesian companies.14l
Many of the Indonesian companies
produce paper with purchased pulp, so in
pulp production, their share is smaller.
On the other hand, all the five state
enterprises are integrated and produce
pulp. The total capacity of pulp produc-
tion in 1984 was 317, 000 ton per annum.
Of this, the five state enterprises accounted
for 39 percent, the one foreign company
28 percent, and the seven private Indo-
nesian companies the remaining 33 percent.
14) The data source is Indonesian Pulp and
Paper Association.
5. Cement
There are 10 companies in this industry
(to be exact, nine companies and one
group (Indocement) of companies). In
1985, about 10. 5 million ton of cement
was produced. The five state enterprises
(Semen Padang, Semen Gresik, Semen
Tonasa, Semen Baturaja, and Semen Ku-
pang) produced 3. 9 million tons, whereas
the three foreign companies (Semen
Cibinong, Semen Nusantara, and Semen
Andalas Indonesia) produced 2.3 million
tons. Indocement Group (including Cirebon
Cement, which is an affiliated company of
Indocement) accounted for the rest (38
percent) .15) This group is controlled by
the famous Indonesian entrepreneur Liem
Sioe Liong. Recently, the Indonesian
government bought 35 percent of Indo-
cement Group's equity, but since this is
a minority holding and there is such a
powerful figure as Liem Sioe Liong, this
can be still regarded as a private group.
6. Petroleum Refining
Unlike the other ASEAN countries, there
are no multinational companies operating
refineries in Indonesia. Petroleum refining
is the monopoly of the state oil company
Pertamina.
In the early 1960s, Shell and Stanvac
were operating refineries, but the Sukarno
government decided to nationalize the oil
industry (exploration, refining, and market-
ing) in 1961 (Law No. 44) and began
negotiating with the two companies on the
terms of take-over. Shell's refineries were
15) The data source is ASI (Asosiasi Semen
Indonesia) .
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transferred to Permina (a predecessor of
Pertamina) by 1966, and Stanvac's to Per-
tamina by 1969. Since Stanvac's transfer
was completed, there have been no private
(national or foreign) refineries in Indo-
nesia.16)
7. Petrochemicals
There is no integrated petrochemical
industry in Indonesia. Naphtha, from which
ethylene, propylene, and other major petro-
chemical products are made, is produced
in Pertamina's refineries, but all of it is
exported. Indonesia's petrochemical plants
are in the middle-stream and downstream
sectors.
There are six plants in the middle-
stream sector today. Three of them are
owned by Pertamina. One plant produces
PTA (purified terephthalic acid) at Plaju,
Palembang, which is used for synthetic
fiber production. The paraxylene needed
for PTA production is imported. Another
plant produces methanol from natural gas
at Pulau Bunyu, Kalimantan. Methanol is
used for production of synthetic glue
(needed in the plywood industry) and
paint. The third plant began producing
polypropylene in 1973. Production stopped
in 1982, however, since production costs
were too high, and the plant has remained
inactive since then [ICN October 22,
1984 : 6].
There are two plants producing PVC
(polyvinyl chloride) from imported VCM
(vinyl chloride monomer) . Both are
16) For the history of the nationalization of the
oil industry, see Anderson G. Bartlett III et
al. [1972].
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Japanese companies (Standard Toyo Poly-
mer and Eastern Polymer). And there is
one private Indonesian company produc-
ing polystyrene from imported styrene
monomer (Polychem Lindo).
There are a number of companies pro-
ducing final plastic products (PVC pipes,
PVC film, polypropylene film, plastic bags,
etc.) . Here there are no state enterprises.
There are some foreign companies (for
example, Pralon producing PVC pipes, and
Meiwa Indonesia producing PVC printed
film and sheets), but their market shares
are small. In this sector, private Indonesian
companies dominate. Many of them are,
however, small, although there are several
companies with investment of US $ a few
million.
8. Fertilizer
There are six fertilizer companies, all
of them state-owned. The largest com-
pany, Pupuk Srivijaya, is typical of fertilizer
production in Indonesia. It is located at a
site where natural gas is available. From
natural gas, ammonia is obtained, and from
ammonia, urea is produced. Four other
companies use the same method. The only
exception is Petro Kimia Gresik. Since
there is no natural gas in the vicinity, it
buys ammonia or takes ammonia from the
naphtha it buys, and produces ammonium
sulphate. Also, it imports phosphate to
produce phosphatic fertilizer, and potassic
fertilizer to produce mixed fertilizer.
Fertilizer production is related to oil
and natural gas, and could be part of
Pertamina's operation, but the fertilizer
companies are separate state enterprises.
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Pusri (Pupuk Srivijaya) was set up as an
independent organization as early as 1959,
well before Pertamina came into existence.
This enabled the fertilizer industry to re-
main independent of the oil industry in
the 1970s when Sutowo, head of Pertamina,
was diversifying rapidly with large oil
revenues.
9. Dry-cell Batteries
While Union Carbide's 'Eveready' is the
dominant brand in the other ASEAN coun-
tries, in Indonesia its market share is lowest.
The best selling brand is the Indonesian
brand 'ABC,' which is owned by Inter-
callin, a member of the ABC group, which
is also known as a food producer. Accord-
ing to one estimate, its share is about 65
percent. The second best-selling brand,
'National' (owned by Matsushita Electric
of Japan), accounts for another 20 percent,
and 'Eveready' for the rest (15 percent).17>
Local brands are often sold at lower prices,
but this is not true of 'ABC' batteries.
They compete with the foreign brands on
quality.
10. Detergents
Although several companies produce
detergents, two of them dominate the in-
dustry. One is the ubiquitous multinational
company, Unilever, which is known for
'Rinso' in Indonesia. The other is a private
Indonesian company (Dino Indonesia, a
member of the Roda Mas Group), which
sells its detergents under the brand name
17) The data source is National Gobel. A similar
figure (70 percent) is given in CISI Raya
Utama [1986: 1].
'Dino.' At present, 'Rinso' seems to have
the upper hand over 'Dina,' but not by
much. Dina Indonesia is offering strong
competition to Unilever.
11. Pharmaceuticals
There are two kinds of modern medi-
cine. The first is available only with a
doctor's prescription, the second is sold
freely over the counter. Foreign companies
are not allowed to produce the seGond
category of medicine, but in terms of value,
the former is far more important. In this
category. according to one estimate, foreign
companies account for about 70 percent
of the market.181
There are numerous foreign companies
involved, and none is dominant. The largest
foreign company around 1985 was Ciba-
Geigy, but its market share was not much
more than 3 percent [SCRIP March 24.
1986 : 23J. The 70 percent market share
of the foreign companies is spread much
more evenly than in other industries domi-
nated by foreign companies.
There are a few state enterprises in-
volved in this industry (the major one being
Kimia Farma), but private Indonesian
companies are far more important in terms
of market share. In 1985. the largest private
Indonesian company was Kalbe Farma.
whose market share of 4.9 percent was
bigger than Ciba-Geigy's (3.4 percent).
Interbat was the second largest. with a
market share of 3.1 percent. These large
Indonesian companies produce medicines
under license through technical tie-up
18) Interview with Mr. Motoo Kusaka of Takeda
Indonesia (May 1986).
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with foreign manufacturers who have not
invested in Indonesia. They also produce
their own medicines, sometimes using ex-
pired foreign patents. Also, the fact that
it is legally possible to 'pirate' foreign
patents sometimes helps Indonesian phar-
maceutical companies.
There is also traditional medicine called
'jamu.' It is not prescribed by doctors
who have received modern medical educa-
tion, but for a large number of poor people
who go to see 'dukun,' jamu is the major
medicine. It is also taken as a health drink.
We do not know exactly how important
this is compared with modern medicine, but
in view of the large number of stores sell-
ing jamu medicine (some of them located
in modern buildings). sales must be sub-
stantial. Three Indonesian companies. Air
Mancur, ]ago, and Nyonya Meneer, domi-
nate this field.
12. Steel
Unlike most of the other ASEAN coun-
tries, there is an integrated steel mill in
Indonesia. It is a state enterprise, Krakatau
Steel.19)
Krakatau is active in strengthening the
upstream portion of the steel industry. At
present, it can supply steel for construction
and shipbuilding, but cannot produce thin
steel plates used in industries such as
automobiles and household electrical appli-
ances. To fill this vacuum. it has set up
Cold Rolling Mill Indonesia Dtama, together
with the Liem Sioe Liong Group and a
19) The basic data source of this section is Nippon
Tekko Renmei [1984]. Nippon Tekko Renmei
is the association of steelmakers in Japan.
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Western steel company (Sestriacier SA
of Luxemburg, contributing 20 percent
equity). Production is scheduled to start
in 1987. In tin plate, Krakatau Steel has
set up Pelat Timah Nusantara with Tam-
bang Timah (a state mining company) and
a private group (Nusamba, 24 percent).
Construction of the plant was completed
in 1985. and commercial production has
begun.
There are a number of melting plants
(which produce steel from scrap iron) .
The largest melting plant is an Indian
company (Ispat Indo) which accounts for
about a third of the total melting capacity.
The rest are private Indonesian companies.
Being an integrated steel mill, Krakatau
produce most major steel products. The
only exception is GI sheets. which are
produced only by private companies. In
this sector. although technology is relatively
simple. one third of the total capacity is
owned by foreign companies. The rest is
owned by private Indonesian companies.
In structural steels and steel pipes. both
Krakatau Steel and private (foreign and
Indonesian) companies are involved. In
these products. the only foreign producer
is the Indian company mentioned above.
So. Indonesian companies dominate. and of
Krakatau Steel and private Indonesian
companies, the latter are far more impor-
tant.
In tin cans, there were about 10 relatively
large companies operating in the early
1980s. Of these. only one was foreign
(United Can). This was, however, the
biggest. and its market share seems to
have been substantial. It has factories not
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only in Java, but also in Bali, Sumatra,
and Sulawesi, and caters to the needs of
factories located in those places.
13. Aluminum Smelting
This is the monopoly of Indonesia Asahan
Aluminium. Since its major shareholders
are Japanese, it should be regarded as a
foreign (Japanese) company; but certain
factors make use reluctant to do so. One
is that the amount of investment is huge
for a foreign investment. The equity of
the company is US $ 400 million, and the
total amount invested is US $ 2 billion.
The major reason for such large invest-
ment is that the electricity needed for
aluminum smelting was not available, and
the company therefore had to construct a
dam, a hydro-electric power plant, and
transmission facilities. 20)
The Indonesian government has 25
percent equity in this company, and the
rest is held by Japanese investors. This
is not, however, a typical Japanese invest-
ment : half of the Japanese equity is held
by a financial institution of the Japanese
government, the Overseas Economic Coop-
eration Fund (OECF). The rest is held
by 12 Japanese companies (five aluminum
smelters and seven trading companies).
This company is thus a 'states' company in
that the Japanese and Indonesian govern-
ments hold a majority (62.5 percent), and
cannot therefore be treated like a private
foreign company.
20) The data in this paragraph were supplied by
Indonesia Asahan Aluminium.
14. Shipbuilding and Repairing
This is one of the weakest industries in
Indonesia. In the late 1970s, none of the
shipyards had built a ship exceeding 1, 000
tons [nCA 1979 : 34J. In the past several
years, the situation has improved some-
what, and now a few yards can build ships
up to 3, 500 tons, but all large ocean-going
vessels are still built abroad.
There are no foreign companies involved
in this industry. Of the 12 largest shipyards,
seven are state enterprises, and the rest
are private Indonesian companies.211 In
terms of technological sophistication, state
enterprises are more advanced, and their
operation is, on average, bigger than that
of the private companies. Most private
companies thrive on orders placed by the
Indonesian oil company, Pertamina, for
which they have built tug boats, small oil
tankers (used for inter-island shipping),
offshore structures, platforms, and derricks.
15. Automobiles
All motor vehicles produced in Indonesia
carry foreign brands. Japanese brands are
dominant, accounting for more than 90
percent of the motor vehicles sold in 1985.22 )
In this year, the four best-selling brands
were Daihatsu, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, and
Toyota.
21) The 12 shipyards are Dok & Perkapalan
Tanjung Priok, Dok & Perkapalan Surabaya,
Ippa Gaya Baru, Kodja, Pelita Bahari, PAL
Surabaya, Industri Kapal Indonesia, Adiguna
Shipyard, Dumas, Inggom Shipyard, Menara,
and Intan Sengkunyit. The first seven are
state enterprises, and the last five are private
companies.
22) The data source is GAKINDO.
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Unlike such goods as TV sets, it is
difficult for an Indonesian company to
make inroads into this industry, because
major parts (except tires, batteries) are not
standardized, which makes it impossible
to shop around for them. In particular, the
key part of an automobile, the engine, is
not available .in the market, since every
major auto manufacturer produces its own
engines. Even if an Indonesian manu-
facturer managed to obtain engines and
other parts and to produce automobiles,
they would be of .poorer quality and not
acceptable to consumers. So, the typical
pattern. in Indonesia. as in other ASEAN
countries, is for a local company to tie up
with a major foreign company and produce
its products under license.
16. Automobile Tires
Bridgestone Tire Indonesia, Goodyear
Indonesia, Gadjah Tunggal, and Intirub
are the four major tire producers, account-
ing for about 95 percent of the market.
The first two are foreign companies, the
third an private Indonesian company, and
the forth a state enterprise. In mid-1984,
in terms of installed capacity, the two for-
eign companies accounted for almost 60
percent of the total, while the state enter-
prise and the private Indonesian company
split the remainder [leN June 25, 1984:
4J.
Tire manufacturing does· not seem to
present insurmountably high technical
barriers to Indonesian companies, since
production know-how is not new and
capital requirement is not terribly high.
But there are some new technologies
which foreign companies can use to offer
better quality products, and a local· com~
pany cannot effectively compete in price,
for the consumers are willing to pay for
quality. After all, they do not want an
accident at high speed due to an inferior
tire.
17. Household Electrical Appliances
There are no reliable estimates on the
market share of foreign companies in this
industry, but there is no question that
they dominate. Among the foreign com-
panies, Japanese companies are by far the
more important.
Household electrical appliances can be
divided into two categories: wireless goods
and white goods. The former consist
largely of electronic goods, such as radio,
TV, and video, while the latter include
airconditioners, refrigerators, and washing
machines. In the second category, one
estimate puts the Japanese market share
at about 90 percenU31 It is difficult for an
Indonesian company to penetrate this
market. One major problem is that much
larger investment is necessary for the pro-
duction of these goods than for the first
category. For the first category, production
consists primarily of assembling, but for
the second, metal working machines and
other processing facilities are needed.
These machines in turn require a number
of skilled workers, most of whom have to
be trained within a firm.
In the wireless goods, the Japanese
share is lower (probably around 60-70
23) Interview with Mr. Iwao Nishimura of Sanyo
Industries Indonesia (May 1986).
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percent). In addition, there is a European
share, and Indonesian companies (no state
enterprises) have also made some inroads.
For example, the major kretek producer,
Djarum Kudus, set up Hartono Istana
Electronic, which assembles 'Polytron'
color TV sets. In addition, there are a
few other Indonesian brands competing
with well established Japanese brands.
This is possible because the necessary
components can be imported cheaply from
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea. The
rapid revaluation of the Japanese yen in
the first half of 1986 offers Indonesian pro-
ducers a good chance to increase their
share, because the Japanese producers
depend on Japan for major components.
IV Overall Characteristics
1. The belief that foreign capital domi-
nates Indonesian industry is a myth. In
the capital-intensive material industries,
where foreign capital is often present in
the other ASEAN countries, there is no
foreign capital in Indonesia. There are
no multinationals in petroleum refining,
and no foreign integrated steel mills and
fertilizer plants. Shipyards are also all
Indonesian-owned. Even in the less capital-
intensive processing industries, there are
a number of large Indonesian companies
(for example, cement and spinning).
There are, however, sectors where for-
eign companies dominate. In sheet glass
(which we did not discuss in the previous
section), a Japanese company (Asahimas)
has a monopoly. In PVC production, two
Japanese companies are the only producers.
In pharmaceuticals, European and American
companies dominate. In some food pro-
ducts, foreign share exceeds 50 percent.
However, it is in consumer durables, espe-
cially automobiles and household electrical
appliances that foreign domination is espe-
cially noticeable. However, one should
bear in mind that there are anumber of
other industries in which foreign capital
is of minor importance or not involved at
all.
2. Foreign companies are strongest in
the fields where the following three con-
ditions are met. a) There is proprietary
knowledge involved in production, so that
an Indonesian company cannot make up
for its technological deficiency by buying
machines. b) There is an economy of
scale in production, so that a large part
of output has to be exported to make up
for the deficiency of domestic demand.
c) There is a problem of safety involved,
so that it is difficult to make up for lower
quality with lower prices. The automobile
industry, for example, meets these three
conditions.
While a well-established brand gives
a foreign company an advantage, this
alone is not enough to deter Indonesian
companies from entering the field. It has
proved possible for Indonesian companies
to compete with well-established foreign
brands by offering lower prices and / or
undertaking vigorous sales campaigns. (A
case in point is the success of the Roda
Mas group in detergents and MSG.)
Capital intensity alone is not also suffi-
cient to deter Indonesian companies. First
of all, the Indonesian government under-
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Ta'ble 2 Foreign Investment in the Indonesian
Manufacturing Industry (as of March
31, 1983)
Note: The figures include foreign loans (in
addition to equity investment) and
are realized amount.
Source: Bank Indonesia.
include Indonesian companies which are
licensees of foreign brand products. A
number of Indonesian companies produce
under license Japanese consumer durables
(especially automobiles and household
electrical appliances). Since the Indo-
nesian companies which we regard as
heavily dependent on foreign technology
are concentrated in consumer durables,
which Japanese products dominate. the
inclusion of such companies further in-
creases the importance of Japanese com-
panies.
In some of the sectors where foreign
capital is important, there is little or no
involvement by Japanese companies. There
are no Japanese companies in soft drinks,
beer. cigarettes, pulp and paper, detergents,
or melting of scrap iron. In pharmaceuti-
cals, Japanese companies are involved, but
European and American companies domi-
took a number of capital-intensive projects.
There are also a number of private plants
in which a few million US dollars or more
have been invested. Unless a project re-
quires a really large investment. Indonesia
can usually undertake it alone.24l
In the early phase of industrialization
under President Suharto, Indonesia was
short of capital, and foreign investment
moved into various fields where capital
requirements were the major barriers to
their development. Textiles is one such
example. As the Indonesian economy im-
proved, however, more Indonesian capital
moved in, and the field was gradually
closed to foreign investment. As a result,
the share of foreign capital declined.
3. Among foreign companies, Japanese
companies dominate. Table 2 shows the
amount of investment in the manufactur-
ing industry by country, including foreign
loans. Japan is by far the biggest inves-
tor, even if its investment in basic metals
(which includes investment in aluminum
smelting) is excluded.
The importance of Japanese companies
is in fact greater than indicated by Table
2. In our classification, foreign companies
24) The ability of Indonesia to undertake capital-
intensive projects (especially in steel and
petrochemicals) has somewhat declined in the
past few years due to the decline of oil price.
(Oil revenues are the major source of income
for the Indonesian government.) The govern-
ment had to put off large investment pro-
jects, and also invite foreign and private
Indonesian capital to undertake capital-in-
tensive projects. but so far, foreign invest-
ment in such projects has not materialized,
except that in Cold Rolling Mill Indonesia
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nate.
4. In no other ASEAN country has the
government been so actively involved
in industrialization as in Indonesia. The
state oil company, Pertamina, has a mono-
poly over petroleum refining and is at
present the only producer of methanol and
PTA. The government-owned Krakatau
Steel is the only integrated steel mill in
Indonesia. In fertilizer, there are no pri-
vate companies. In shipbuilding, state
enterprises are bigger and have better
facilities. In cement, pulp, and yarn pro-
duction, the share of state enterprises is
substantial.
Government involvement In industry
began in 1957, when President Sukarno
took over Dutch companies. Many of
these operate today, mostly under new
names. This government take-over is one
important reason for the direct government
involvement in industry today, but it is not
the only reason. There has also been a
streak of socialist thought influencing the
economic policy of post-Independence
Indonesia that is partly the result of the
independence process itself. Unlike the
other ASEAN countries, Indonesia had to
fight for independence. The enemy was
Dutch colonialism, which was really an
extension of Dutch capitalism. Thus, Indo-
nesian independence fighters were attracted
to socialism, as the other polar economic
system which negates capitalism. However,
people like Sukarno did not go all the way
toward socialism. They preferred a mixture
of socialism and capitalism.
While the fervor of independence grad-
ually faded, socialist influence remained
alive. Under President Suharto, it took
the form of economic nationalism, and
with the abundance of oil money, the
government undertook a number of large
investment projects. For example, the
integrated steel mill, Krakatau Steel, was
one of these projects. Others include new
petroleum refineries, fertilizer plants, and
cement factories. There were also ambi-
tious petrochemical projects (for example,
the construction of olefin and aromatic
centers), but except for the recently com-
pleted PTA and methanol plants, the others
have had to be shelved due to the recent
decline of the oil price.
There are small state enterprises which
were formerly Dutch companies, but the
importance of state enterprises lies in
the capital-intensive, material-producing
sector. In the less capital-intensive process-
ing or finished-products sector, private
companies, including foreign companies,
are predominant. Thus, we can charac-
terize the Indonesian industrial structure
as 'upstream socialism, downstream capi-
talism. '25)
5. In view of the fact that private capital
was stifled during the Sukarno period and
little capital was available for industrial
25) The term 'state capitalism' is often used in-
stead of 'socialism.' However, 'state capitalism'
is a contradiction in terms. One of the key
foundations of capitalism is private ownership
of the means of production, especially capital.
In socialism the means of production is owned
by the state. So, a state enterprise is alien to
capitalism, and the term 'state capitalism'
does not make sense. It can be best re-
garded as a form of socialism.
One might object to our use of the term
'socialism,' for it is often associated with
egalitarianism and it can be hardly said that /'
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development when President Suharto began
rebuilding the economy, the response of
Indonesian entrepreneurship in the last
20 years has been impressive.
For example, consider the Indocemenf
Group. In about 10 years, a huge cement
complex was built in Cibinong, a suburb of
Jakarta, and it is estimated that about one
billion dollars was invested there.26) At full
capacity, it can produce 7.7 million tons
of cement per annum, which is more than
any single cement complex in Japan can
produce. The Indocement complex is
probably biggest in Asia.27>
This may be an exceptional case, but
there are a number of other relatively
'" the Indonesian power elites are committed to
egalitarian ideals. But a socialist state need to
be no more egalitarian than a capitalist state.
For example, Japan seems more eg3,litarian
than the Soviet Union. State ownership of
the means of production can make the distri-
bution of income and wealth more equal, but
does not necessarily do so. Thus, the fact
rather than the effect of state ownership should
be the criterion of socialism.
26) Semen Nusantara has a capacity of 750, 000
tons per year, and the investment needed
. was about US $ 100 million [leN April 4,
1983]. Today, Indocement's capacity is about
10 times as large as Semen Nusantara's
(ASI). From this, the figure of US $ one
billion was derived.
27) Liem Sioe Liong, who controls Indocement
. Group, is a close associate of President
Suharto, and has used this connection for
his businesses, and thus some people are re-
luctant to regard him as a private entre-
preneur. But if we exclude politically con-
nected entrepreneurs, very few are left in
the capitalist sector of Indonesia today. The
fact is that in Indonesia, both business acu-
men and .political connections are required
to become big. Liem Sioe Liang is the most
politically connected businessman, but on this
account alone, we cannot exclude him from
large investments. Nien Kin constructed
two large steel plants and several integrated
textile mills. There are several other large
mills. Recently, Dan Liris, Maligi, and
Sandratex--spinners owning at least
60,000 spindles each--joined together
to set up a plant to produce polyester fiber,
partly as a step for backward integration.
In the plastic industry, there are several
plants in each of which at least several
million US dollars has been invested (for
example, Polychem Lindo producing
polystylene and Argha Karya Prima In-
dustry producing polypropylene film).
How these investments were financed is
not entirely clear. Some must have come
from the companies' own funds, but an
important part must have come "from state
banks. It is conceivable' that since the
government had large revenues in the 1970s
due to the high oil price, part was chan-
nelled into state financial institutions and
made available for private. investment. In
the case of plywood, part of financing seems
to have come from prospective foreign
buyers who were willing to advance neces-
sary capital against future delivery.
The other question is how the necessary
technology was obtained. In the mid-1960s,
the level of technology and the number of
the group of entrepreneurs.
In the case of Indocement, he invested his
money on the conviction that it would pay
off. There was a great deal. of risk involved,
and this we regard as the essence of entre-
preneurship. Contrary to what some argue,
he could not monopolize the industry. For
example, he could not prevent other plants
from being established, nor could he take away
demand from those whose plant utilization is
higher. (That of Indocement is ,lowest today.)
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skilled personnel seem equally as serious a
problem as capital. This problem, however,
turned out to be less serious than expected.
Many new technologies are embodied
in machines, so that their introduction
into Indonesia was largely a matter of
finance. If an Indonesian company did
not know how to set up a plant, a foreign
engineering company could be employed
to do it, and if it did not know how to
operate it, the engineering company could
give the necessary training. When foreign
technicians were needed on a long-term
basis, they could be hired as individuals
or obtained through a company offering
technical assistance.
What is surprising is the strength of
local· brands. In no other ASEAN country
do local brands compete with established
foreign brands as well as they do in Indo-
nesia. Strong local brands are, for example,
Gudang Garam, Djarum, Bentoel (the three
are clove cigarette brands), Teh Botol (soft
drinks), Dino (detergent), Sasa (MSG),
and ABC (dry-cell batteries).
Some local brands have taken adavantage
of the traditional tastes of the Indonesian
people. Teh Botol took advantage of the
tea drinking habits of the people, and
jamu medicine producers used to their
advantage the reliance of many Indonesians
on local herbs. Also, the clove cigarette
manufacturers realized the potential appeal
to the Indonesian people of clove cigarettes,
which had been produced on a much
smaller scale before cigarettes were brought
in from the West.
Some successful local brands targetted
on the lower income classes, which could
not afford to buy foreign brands. In this
case, there was initially not much com-
petition between Indonesian and foreign
brands. But once Indonesian companies
succeeded in establishing their brands
among the lower classes, they began
using this as a base to compete with
foreign brands for the higher income
classes. The most spectacular success
story of this type in recent years has
been the rise of local brands of cosmet-
icS.28l As a result, foreign brands have
been losing their share of the cosmetics
market. Clove cigarettes pioneered this,
and now cosmetics is following the same
path. Teh Botol today does not compete
much with Coca Cola in the same market
(Coca Cola is consumed largely by people
in higher income brackets), but in the
future it may follow the path of clove
cigarettes and cosmetics.29l
In some cases, local brands had an early
start, and had an advantage over foreign
companies in getting accepted by con-
sumers and setting up a solid distribution
network. Ajinomoto, for example, was a
few years behind Sasa, and this put it at
a serious disadvantage. For one thing,
Ajinomoto found it difficult to sell its prod-
ucts to consumers who were accustomed
to the taste of Sasa.
A puzzling question is why those con-
ditions which helped local brands in In-
28) Popular local brands are 'Viva,' 'Marbella,'
'Sariayu,' and 'Mustika Ratu.'
29) Coca Cola is not unbeatable. Once it domi-
nated the soft drink market in Japan, but in
the past several years a large number of
Japanese brands have appeared, and Coca
Cola's share is no longer large.
donesia did n.ot prevail in the other
ASEAN countries. One important reason
seems to be the economic chaos and the
absence of multinational companies before
around 1970, when industrialization got off
the ground. The public were less exposed
to foreign brands, partly because there
were no foreign multinationals and partly
because economic deterioration narrowed
their choice. And because the foreign
companies were cut off from Indonesia for a
number of years, they could not strengthen
their position in the country and take
advance measures to prevent the entry of
local producers.
The strength of local brands should not
be over-emphasized. Where the techno~
logical superiority of foreign brands is
obvious (in safety, reliability, service, etc.),
these are quite strong. This is particularly
true in consumerdurables, where foreign"
especially Japanese, brands are strong. It
is also true, however, that in the areas
where foreign-brand products are less
technically superior or where quality is
not of overriding importance and can be
overcome by lower prices, Indonesian
brands are fairly strong. This situation is
somewhat unique among the ASEAN
countries.
6. Among the private Indonesian com-
panies we studied, only a handful could
be identified as pribumi companies. One
is in steel pipes (Bakrie), a few are in
shipbuilding (for example, the Ibnu Sutowo
family), a few in textiles, and several in
plywood. We' may have missed some, but
there is no question that practically almost
all major manufacturing companies are
owned by Chinese.30)
In the Indonesian economy, the Chinese
dominate the private sector. This situa-
tion can be partly attributed to government
policy. For one thing, the government has
not taken serious measures to nurture
major pribumi companies. Here and there,
one can find exceptions, but the govern-
ment seems to have felt that even if the
Chinese dominate the private sector, as
long as there is a large state-enterprise
sector, the overall· economy will not be
dominated by the Chinese.
Even in the private sector, the govern-
ment does not allow the Chinese a free
hand. In granting concessions and ex-
tending financial support, the government
requires that if a Chinese is involved, he
has to tie up with a pribumi. What hap-
pens, however, is that the pribumi be-
comes a sleeping partner, leaving manage-
ment to the Chinese. Of course, the pri-
bumi demands a share of the profits, but
he is usually quite happy to let the Chinese
'do the donkey work.' The government
agency in charge simply examines whether
the application fulfills its requirements, but
rarely investigates whether the pribumi
who appears on the application will be
really involved in management as a fully-
30) A person is considered as Chinese if his father
was Chinese. So, under this definition, people
like .Bob Hasan, who have been fairly well
integrated into Indonesian society, become
Chinese.
Our definition centers on the father, since
identification was easier for the prewar period.
All Chinese then carried Chinese names, and
we consider those who did as Chinese. This
may not be a rigorous definition, but it
suffices for our purposes.
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fledged partner. So, even in the sectors
where, in some ASEAN countries, indig-
enous entrepreneurship is strong because
of government support, in Indonesia the
Chinese dominate.
In the ASEAN countries, including
Indonesia, business tends to be dominated
by the Chinese. One reason for this is
the fact that an indigenous businessman
does not have the kind of business net-
work that his Chinese competitor can make
use of. At least until a few decades ago,
it was difficult for him to get a bank
loan, since banks were owned by Chinese
or foreigners. It was difficult for him to
buy on credit, since the suppliers were
all Chinese or foreigners. Today, the sit-
uation has somewhat improved for the
pribumi, especially in the field of finance,
but the distribution network is still domi-
nated by the Chinese. There is also the
question of work ethic. For the Chinese,
because of social discrimination, business is
virtually the only field left where he can
excel, and he usually works hard to succeed.
In this situation, if the government adopts
a laissez-faire attitude, business becomes
dominated by the Chinese. Certainly, the
Indonesian government is far from laissez-
faire ; but it did not do much to nurture
pribumi entrepreneurs who could take the
lead in the private sector.3l)
As a consequence, pribumi entrepreneur-
ship is underdeveloped, but it is more
noticeable outside industry. There are large
31) Specifically, the government has not done
much to help pribumi businessmen in the
capitalist sector. It has done considerably
more to help small businessmen through KIK
and KMKP loans.
pribumi businessmen in shipping, banking,
oil-related fields, life insurance, construc-
tion, hotel, air transportation, and publish-
ing, but only a few are involved in industry.
Why this is so is not clear, although two
possible reasons suggest themselves. One
is the weakness of pribumi entrepreneur-
ship in distribution. Usually, the producers
have to have a distribution network in
order to sell their products, but since
such networks are mostly controlled by
Chinese who are reluctant to accept the
pribumi manufacturers, the pribumi manu-
facturers are at a disadvantage in compet-
ing with the Chinese manufacturers, even
if their products are of comparable quality.
The few relatively large pribumi manu-
facturers we found are usually in areas
where a distribution network linking the
producer to the consumer is not neces-
sary. (For example, the major purchaser
is the government, as in the case of ship-
building.) The only exception is textiles,
in which there has been a long tradition
of pribumi involvement in distribution.
The other problem for the pribumi in
industry is that of technology. For a pri-
bumi entrepreneur contemplating going
into industry, it was probably difficult for
him to get pribumi engineers (they had
to be pribumi since the Chinese in general
did not want to work for them), since
those available wanted to work for state
enterprises (and those in state enterprises
did not want to risk their careers by
moving to a company whose success was
uncertain) . For a Chinese entrepreneur,
this was less of a problem since Chinese
engineers were not happy to go to state
M7
enterprises (for fear of discrimination).
And if domestic skill was not sufficient,
a Chinese entrepreneur could hire techni-
cians from Hong Kong or Taiwan. A
pribumi entrepreneur could also hire
foreign technicians, especially from .Japan
and Europe, but for a number of categories
of skill needed in Indonesia, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong technicians were probably
cheaper for similar service rendered. To
a pribumi entrepreneur, these people were
not available primarily for cultural reasons.
V Concluding Comments
We divided major industrial companies
into state enterprises, foreign companies,
and" private Indonesian companies, and
examined their relative positions in 17
industries. We found that state enter-
prises dominate the capital-intensive mate-
rial industry (the 'upstream sector'), and
the private (foreign and Indonesian) com-
panies dominate the less capital-intensive
finished products industry (the 'down-
stream sector'). Thus, we characterized
the industrial-structure of the Indonesian
industry as 'upstream socialism, down-
stream capitalism.'
In the downstream sector, there is
substantial foreign involvement, but it is
largely ,in automobiles and household elec~
tricalappliances that foreign companies
are dominant. In pharmaceuticals, foreign
companies are also strong, but their supe-
riority has been somewhat eroded by the
challenge of Indonesian companies, espe-
cially the jamu makers, who exploit the
traditional mentality of the Indonesian
34.8
people. In other fields (except beer and
a few other minor products we did not
cover) ,321 private Indonesian companies
are quite strong. Even in the fields where
several million US dollars is needed as a
minimum investment, there are a number
of Indonesian companies, and foreign com-
panies, which dominated such fields ini-
tially when Indonesia lacked capital, have
been losing importance in recent years.
Textiles is a typical· example of this.
From a nationalist point of view, the
presence of foreign companies may be
still too large. The major way to reduce
their importance is to raise the level of
technology in Indonesia, because in the
fields where foreign companies dominate,
Indonesia does not possess the· necessary
know-how. To raise the level of technology,
it may be important to train people in
high-tech fields; but at the same time,
Indonesia still has to train people in
mature areas, such as spinning, weaving,
and finishing. In such areas, there are still
a substantial number of foreign technicians
hired by Indonesian companies.
The importance of state enterprises in
the upstream sector has serious implica-
tions concerning the question of industrial
efficiency. In general, state enterprises are
not efficient, and Indonesia's state enter-
prises are no exception. For example,
recently, one state cement company re-
32) They are margarine (Dnilever), instant coffee
(Indofood Jaya Raya (Nestle», powdered
and condensed milk (Food Specialities Indo-
nesia (Nestle), Indomilk (Australian Dairy
Corp.), Friesche Vlag Indonesia), and shoes
(Sepatu Bata Indonesia).
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ported huge losses. 33) Krakatau Steel and
Pertamina's petrochemical plants are also
known not to be very efficient. But Indo-
nesia cannot privatize them, because pri-
vatization means 'Chinesenization' or 'for-
eignization,' for there are no 'genuine'
pribumi businessmen who are ready to
take over them. So, the government is
stuck with most of the state enterprises.
(Small ones may be sold in the future, but
this does not change our argument.) Yet,
if such enterprises dominate the upstream
sector, the downstream sector has to buy
expensive inputs from them since their
products are protected from import com-
petition. As a consequence, its products
not only become expensive to the consum-
ers but also cannot be exported. In fact,
the present 'high cost' structure of the
Indonesia economy is due partly to the
dominance of state enterprises in the
upstream sector. Unfortunately, since the
government is stuck with state enterprises
for the reason pointed out above, there will
be no wayout from this in the forseeable
future. So, though industrialization will
go on, it will continue to be plagued with
the problem of inefficiency.
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